We study the maximum attainable rate or capacity of fingerprinting codes under the marking assumption. It is proved that capacity for fingerprinting against coalitions of size two and three over the binary alphabet satisfies 0.25 < C2,2 < 0.322 and 0.083 < C3,2 < 0.199 respectively. For coalitions of an arbitrary fixed size, we derive a closed-form upper bound on fingerprinting capacity in the binary case. Finally, for general alphabets, we establish upper bounds on the fingerprinting capacity involving only single-letter mutual information quantities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of fingerprinting is to protect licensed content against unauthorized redistribution or piracy. Suppose a distributor has some content which he would like to distribute among a set of licensed users. One can think of a simple scheme where each licensed copy is identified by a unique imperceptible mark (fingerprint) which is embedded in the content. If a naive user distributes a copy of his fingerprinted content, then the pirated copy can easily be traced back to the guilty user. Tracing the guilty user becomes more difficult when a group of users (pirates) form a coalition to detect the fingerprints and modify/erase them before illegally distributing the data. Digital fingerprinting is a technique that assigns to each user a mark in a way that enables the distributor to identify at least one of the members of the coalition as long as its size does not exceed a certain threshold t, which is a parameter of the problem.
There are two main setups considered for the fingerprinting problem in the literature: the distortion setting (e.g., [10] ) and the marking assumption setting [8] . We will use the latter setting in this paper. In this case, the fingerprint is a set of redundant digits written in some fixed positions (unknown to the users) across the information digits of the original content. The fingerprint positions remain the same for all users. The coalition attempts to discover some of the fingerprint positions by comparing their marked copies for differences. The marking assumption states that the coalitions may modify only those positions where they find a difference in their fingerprinted copies. The collection of fingerprints distributed to all the users of the system together with the decoding strategy used is called a code below. A code is said to be tfingerprinting or collusion-secure against coalitions of t pirates if the error probability of decoding approaches 0 as the code length tends to oc.
Collusion-secure fingerprinting codes were introduced by Boneh and Shaw [8] and were further studied in [6] , [11] among others. For the problem formulation considered in this paper, it was shown in [8] that it becomes necessary for the distributor to use some form of randomization, where the random key is known only to the distributor, to construct such fingerprinting codes.
In this paper, we are interested in establishing bounds on the capacity (or maximum attainable rate) of fingerprinting codes.
We denote by Ct,q the capacity of fingerprinting with q-ary codes against coalitions of size t (defined formally later). To date, only some lower bounds are known: C2,2 > 0.2075 [7] ; C3,2 > 0.064 [4] ,Ct,2 > I/(100t2),t > 2 [11] .
New capacity bounds of our paper are proved by a combination of two ideas. Our attainability results are shown by random coding arguments geared toward the average probability of misidentification of attackers by the distributor. For upper bounds, we model fingerprinting as a communications problem and take an information-theoretic approach.
It should be noted that a similar information-theoretic approach to finding the capacity of fingerprinting was previously studied in [10] and [1] . In [10] , the authors find the capacity of fingerprinting with distortion constraints as opposed to the marking assumption setting of this paper. Paper [1] uses the marking assumption setting, but it addresses a simpler problem whose results do not directly apply to fingerprinting.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Fingerprinting codes
We begin with a word on our notation. Random variables (r.v.'s) will be denoted by capital letters and their realizations by smaller-case letters. The probability distribution of an r.v. X will be denoted by Px. For positive integers 1, m, Xl+m will denote the collection of r.v.'s {Xl, xl+1, ... X ., i+m}. Boldface will denote vectors of length n.
Let Q denote an alphabet of (finite) size q and let IC be a set of positive integers. An element of the set IC is called a "key".
Let M denote the number of users in the system. Assume that there is some ordering of the users and denote their set by M = {1,... ,M}. For every k c IC, let (fk,9k) be an nlength code, i.e., a pair of encoding and decoding mappings:
-M U {O}, where the decoder output 0 will signify a decoding failure. By definition, the fingerprinting system is formed by a randomized code, i.e., an r.v. (F, Jb) taking values in the family {(fk, Qk), k C }. Note that the dependence on n has been suppressed in this notation for simplicity. The rate of this code is R = n-1 logq M.
The system operates as follows. The distributor chooses a key k according to a probability distribution w(k) on IC and assigns the fingerprint fk(i) to user i. On receiving a forged fingerprint, the distributor uses the tracing strategy Ok to determine one of the guilty users.
We need randomization because: (a) deterministic fingerprinting codes do not exist in the considered problem setting [8] , [6] , and (b) we allow the family of encoders and decoders, and the distribution w(k) to be known to all users of the system. The only parameter kept secret by the distributor is the key being used.
A coalition U of t users is an arbitrary t-subset of {1,... ,M}. The coalition observes the collection of their fingerprints fk (U) 1, ... , xt} and attempts to create a fingerprint y e Qn that does not enable the distributor to trace it back to any of the users in U. Coordinate i of the fingerprints is called undetectable for the coalition U if Xli = X2i = ... = xti and is called detectable otherwise.
Definition 2.1: The marking assumption states that for any fingerprint y created by the coalition U, yi = Xli = X2i ... = xti in every coordinate i that is undetectable. In other words, in creating y, the pirates can modify only detectable positions. The set of fingerprints that can be created by a coalition U is called the envelope of U. It is described by E(U) = {y e Q12yi = x1,Vi undetectable}.
(1)
We allow the coalitions to use a randomized strategy of the form V(., .), where V(y x1, ... , xt) gives the probability that the coalition creates y given that it observes the fingerprints x. .. xt. Then the probability of error for a given coalition U and strategy V averaged over the family of codes is defined as follows:
The maximum probability of error over all coalitions of size at most t and all coalition strategies V is given by emax(F, 1, t) = max max e(U, F,J, V).
(3) UJIUl<t V Definition 2.2: A randomized code (F, J.) is said to be tfingerprinting with E-error if emax(F, J), t) < E. If we have a sequence of randomized codes for which the probability of error approaches zero as n increases, it is said to be tfingerprinting.
Definition 2.3: The E-capacity of t-fingerprinting Ct,q(E) is the supremum of the rates R such that for every d > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exists a random q-ary code (F, D) of length n with rate n-1 logq M > Rand emax(F, (, t) < E.
The capacity of t-fingerprinting Ct,q = inf >o Ct,q (E) B. Information-theoretic formulation For the problem of upper bounds, we model fingerprinting as a communications problem. The users are analogous to a set of messages, while their fingerprints correspond to the respective codewords. A t-subset of messages (a coalition of size t) is chosen at random to be transmitted over an unknown t-input-single-output channel decided by the strategy of the coalition. The class of possible channels is defined by the marking assumption. The forged fingerprint y corresponds to the channel output. The task of the decoder is to recover one of the transmitted messages to have produced the channel output.
Observe that this information-theoretic model differs from the traditional t-user Multiple Access Channel (MAC) because: (a) the decoder makes an error only when its output does not match any of the transmitted messages, and (b) all channel inputs are required to use the same codebook.
In finding the upper bounds on capacity, we restrict the coalitions to use only memoryless strategies in order to make the problem tractable and to obtain single-letter expressions (Note that the lower bounds take into account all possible coalition strategies, not just memoryless strategies). Let W(t) denote the family of discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) W: Q x ... x Q -> Q with t inputs that satisfy the marking assumption for a single letter, i. where the term e({U . ,..., Ut}, F, J4, W1) is described by (2). Definition 2.4: The E-capacity of t-fingerprinting over the class of memoryless strategies for maximum (resp., average) probability of error is the supremum of the rates R such that for every d > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exists a random code (F, D) of length n with rate n-1 logq M > Rand maximum (resp., average) probability of error satisfying emax(F, 1d, W) < E, for every W e W(t) (resp., e-(F, 1, W) < E, for every W e W(t)).
The capacity of t-fingerprinting over memoryless strategies is the infimum of the corresponding E-capacities for E > 0.
The above definition for capacity takes into account only memoryless coalition strategies. Therefore, this is an upper bound on the overall capacity of fingerprinting Ct,q.
Remark 2.5: For any channel set, the capacity when randomized codes are allowed is the same for both the maximum and average error probability criteria (see, e.g., [9] , p.223, Prob. 5).
III. LOWER BOUNDS FOR BINARY t-FINGERPRINTING
CODES, t = 2, 3 In defining fingerprinting codes, instead of the maximum probability of error over all coalitions (3) , one may also consider the weaker average error criterion given by: e(F,1, t) =1 E max e(U, F, D, V). tM U:IUl<t (8) According to (8) , the decoder succeeds with high probabilityl if it outputs a coalition member for most coalitions out of all (M) coalitions. Thus, considering the average error criterion enables us to tailor the decoder for the typical coalitions, i.e., the coalitions that occur with high probability, and hence achieve higher rates than the worst-case approach. By Remark 2.5, lower bounds on the capacity obtained in this manner will also apply for the capacity problem under maximum error. Note that randomly chosen fingerprints form a typical pair with high probability. To create a forged fingerprint y the pirates must fill the remaining npositions. Let d, = dist(y, xi) and d2 = dist(y, x2), where dist denotes the Hamming distance. Then n 1 I IS and therefore di + d2 C IE.
It suffices for the decoder to consider only typical collusions.
Given a fingerprint y, the decoder takes any pair (di. d2) that satisfies (9) and constructs lists Sy(d1) and Sy(d2) of the fingerprints located at distances d, and d2 from y. Each pair in Sy(d1) x Sy(d2) is then discarded if they simultaneously disagree with y in any position. Finally, a pair is arbitrarily chosen from those remaining and decoding is completed by choosing the pirate that has a smaller distance from y. Obviously, the fingerprints x1 and x2 that belong to the factual pirates will not be discarded by the above decoding algorithm. For two innocent users, any typical pair (Zl, Z2) of their fingerprints should agree in I e IS positions, where they also agree with y to fulfill the marking assumption. In each of the remaining npositions, the vectors z1, Z2 are 'We say that an event occurs with high probability if the probability that it fails is at most exp(-cn), where c is a positive constant.
represented by either (01) or (10) . The total probability of choosing such a pair in a random code of size M = 2nR is at most KM n K8n-1 22n which tends to 0 exponentially fast for any rate R < 0.25.
Similarly, consider a coalition (Xl,,Z2) that includes the fingerprint x1 of an actual pirate and the fingerprint Z2 of an innocent user. Recall that x1 disagrees with y in d, positions.
Then to be output instead of x1, the fingerprint Z2 must agree with y in these positions and disagree with it in another set of d2 < d, positions. The total probability of choosing such a fingerprint Z2 is at most M2n d1,/2r
Since d, + d2 C IS and d2 < dl, this probability tends to 0 exponentially fast for any rate R < 0.25. The same conclusion can be drawn for any two fingerprints of an innocent user and the second pirate. U By using similar techniques, we obtain the following result for the 3 pirates case. The proof is omitted due to space limitations and may be found in [5] . Fix some W e W(t) and let Y be such that Pylx,,...,X, W'. Then, we have the following Markov chain: U1j ... , Ut, K +-* X1, .,. Xt (W* Y and Pr(OK(Y) , {UU, , Ut}) < K,,
which follows from (11) . Now, I(U1, . . .,Ut; YK) =tnR-H(U1, . . .,UtY, K), (15) Proof: We borrow techniques from [2] in this proof. The result is proved for the case t = 2 to ease understanding. It is a straight-forward extension for arbitrary t.
Consider a sequence of families {(fk, 4bk), k C /C} of rate R with probability distribution w(k) over IC such that e(F,J , W) < E (0 < E < 1), for every W e W (2) . Let x(k) =f(i) denote the fingerprints and D(k) {y Ok (y) = i} denote the decoding regions for i = 1, . . . , M, k C IC. Then the above error criterion can be written as follows: where the maximization is over joint distributions such that X1, ..., Xt are i.i.d. and (17) is because we have the Markov chain K <+-Xl, . . , Xt <+-Y. Since the above upper bound is true for every W e W(t), we obtain the stated result by taking n -> oc. U Remark 4.2: The min-max type result in Theorem 4.1 can in fact be improved to a max-min result by allowing the memoryless coalition strategies to vary at every coordinate as opposed to having them fixed in the above proof. Details are available in [5] .
B. The binary case
For Q = {0,1}, we choose the "uniform channel", namely, the channel where the output equals one of the inputs uniformly at random. Evaluating the maximum mutual information in (10) for this channel gives a closed-form upper bound: Since either (29) or (30) holds for every W e W(2), taking n -> oc concludes the proof.
For the case of t = 2 and t = 3, we again pick the "uniform channel" and obtain upper bounds on the expression in Theorem 5.1, which turn out to be stronger than the bounds resulting from (18). Details of the calculations are found in [5] . Combining these upper bounds with our lower bounds from Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 we obtain:
Theorem 5.4: 0.25 < C2,2 < 0.322. 0.083 < C3,2 < 0.199.
